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WHERE'S THE BEEF? DISSECTING
SPAM'S PURPORTED HARMS
ERIC GOLDMANt
I. INTRODUCTION
After many failed attempts over the past six years, Congress finally
enacted a law regulating unsolicited commercial e-mails, the Controlling
the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (the
"CAN-SPAM Act" or "CAN-SPAM").' CAN-SPAM follows significant
state-based efforts to regulate spam; from 1997 to 2003, nearly three
quarters of the states adopted some spam regulation, 2 most of which are
now preempted by CAN-SPAM. 3
CAN-SPAM, like the state laws preceding it, takes a multi-faceted
approach to regulating spam. Among other provisions, CAN-SPAM con-
tains provisions that regulate the e-mail content,4 restrict specific notori-
ous spammer practices,5 give spam recipients the ability to opt-out, and
attack the spammer's funding by creating advertiser liability.
The diversity of regulatory approaches inherent in CAN-SPAM (and,
before that, the superseded state statutes) prompts a fundamental ques-
tion: exactly what harms are caused by spain that these regulations at-
tempt to redress? There is no consensus answer to this question. Just
about everyone seems to agree that spain is a problem that needs to be
t Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. E-mail: eric.goldmanmar-
quette.edu. Personal home page: <http://eric-goldman.tripod.com>. The author thanks the
participants in the Summer 2003 Spain Seminar at The John Marshall Law School for
their enlightening perspectives.
1. Sen. 877, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter CAN-SPAM Act].
2. See David E. Sorkin, Spamlaws.com, Spare Laws: United States: State Laws
<http://www.spamlaws.com/state/index.html> (accessed Oct. 30, 2003).
3. CAN-SPAM preempts all laws expressly regulating the use of e-mail to send com-
mercial messages (except laws that "relate to acts of fraud or computer crime"). CAN-
SPAM Act, supra n. 1, at § 8(b)(2)(B).
4. See e.g. restrictions on misleading subject lines; requirements that the sparn con-
tain contact information and be labeled as an ad or as sexually oriented material.
5. See e.g. restrictions on e-mail harvesting, dictionary attacks, using open mail re-
lays, and signing up for free e-mail accounts.
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addressed,6 but no one seems to agree on why. Without clearly under-
standing the targeted harms, policy-makers cannot craft regulations de-
signed to fix them.
This Essay examines the purported harms caused by spam in an ef-
fort to isolate bona fide areas needing legislative intervention. However,
few such needs exist. Instead, most purported harms are illusory, al-
ready adequately addressed by existing laws or best left to market solu-
tions. This analysis thus undercuts many of the purported justifications
for regulating spam.
II. DEFINING THE HARMS OF SPAM
A. DEFINING SPAM
Any attempt to intelligently discuss spam is immediately hampered
by the word's imprecision. Simply put, the term "spam" lacks a single
well-accepted definition. 7 Usually "spam" refers to some form of un-
wanted e-mail, although some users generalize the term to describe all
forms of unwanted advertising, both in e-mail and other media.8 CAN-
SPAM defines "commercial electronic mail message" as "any electronic
mail message the primary purpose of which is the commercial advertise-
ment or promotion of a commercial product or service." 9 Building on this
definition, this Essay refers to "spam" as unsolicited "commercial elec-
tronic mail messages." However, this definition is both under- and over-
inclusive because the definition includes e-mails recipients want and
does not include all e-mails not wanted by recipients, and thus it may not
track recipient expectations.10
6. See Humphrey Taylor, HarrisInteractive, Majority in Favor of Making Mass-Spam-
ming Illegal Rises to 79% of Those Online, <http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/
index.asp?PID=387> (accessed July 16, 2003) (seventy-nine percent favor making mass-
spamming illegal).
7. See Michelle Delio, Wired News, Spam: Much Hated, Little Defined <http:/!
www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,58682,00.html> (May 1, 2003) (discussing the diversity
of definitions for spam articulated at the Federal Trade Commission's Spam Forum in
Spring 2003); Mailshell, Inc., Results of the SpamCatcher Attitude Survey <http://
www.mailshell.com/mail/client/oem2.html/step/pr/article/17> (Apr. 30, 2003) [hereinafter
Mailshell Survey] (press release of M.ailshell, Inc.) (providing some statistical analysis of
consumer definitions of spam and concluding "[t]here is no clear definition of spam").
8. See Evan Hansen & Stefanie Olsen, CNET News.coin, Spam: It's More Than Bulk
E-mail <http://news.com.com/ 2102-1023_3-961134.html?tag=st util print> (Oct. 8, 2002).
9. CAN-SPAM Act, supra n. 1, at § 3(2). The law further requires the Federal Trade
Commission to promulgate regulations defining "primary purpose." Id. § 3(2)(C).
10. See Deborah Fellows, Pew Internet & American Life Project, Spam: How it is Hurt-
ing E-mail and Degrading Life on the Internet ii <http:/www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/
PIPSpamReport.pdf> (Oct. 22, 2003) [hereinafter The Pew Report] ("e-mail users are not
entirely clear on just what is spam, an issue that is an absolute stopper for writing effec-
tive, enforceable legislation against spam").
[Vol. XXI
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B. SPAM IS ANNOYING
1. Distinguishing Wanted and Unwanted Content
Many e-mail recipients castigate spam as annoying,'1 but the rea-
sons why are less clear. Some annoyance is attributable to the objection-
able content in spam,12 a point addressed infra in subsection II(D).
Otherwise, the annoyance is based (among other factors) on the unsolic-
ited, high-volume, time-consuming or unpreventable nature of spam.13
I believe these concerns all derive from the same source: spam is
unwanted. A simple example may illustrate this. Assume Jane is ready
to purchase a Canon PowerShot S400 digital camera. An unsolicited e-
mail arrives in Jane's in-box from a trustworthy retailer that she has
never transacted with. The retailer offers to sell her the camera for $100
less than any other retailer. Is this spam?
Some recipients would say "yes" because the e-mail is unsolicited or
otherwise invades their privacy. However, most e-mail recipients would
consider this e-mail valuable instead of annoying, in which case they
would want this e-mail because it will save them time and money.
Perhaps this example gives us an important insight on the nature of
spam. E-mail recipients want e-mail that saves money, saves time, edu-
cates on matters of interest, or is otherwise relevant and helpful.
14
Thus, many e-mail recipients gladly would receive unsolicited e-mails
that meet those specifications. In contrast, e-mail recipients are an-
noyed to receive a high volume of irrelevant and unhelpful e-mails.15
Unfortunately, frequently spam is irrelevant and unhelpful to recipi-
ents because it is relatively untargeted. Like any other marketers, spam
advertisers will pay for targeted e-mail lists that are more likely to yield
higher results. However, the negligible marginal cost of sending spam
lowers the optimal level of targeting for spammers. Thus, spammers can
profitably use low-yield and untargeted practices such as e-mail harvest-
11. Id. at 27; Taylor, supra n. 6 (ninety-three percent of those surveyed said spam was
somewhat or very annoying).
12. See The Pew Report, supra n. 10, at 27.
13. See Id.
14. See DoubleClick, 2003 Consumer E-mail Study, Oct. 2003 3 <http://www.double
click.com/us/knowledge-central/documents/research/dc-consumere-mailstudy-0310.pdf>
(Oct. 2003). The survey considered permission-based e-mail marketing. Respondents were
asked what motivated them to act on an e-mail; thirty-eight percent said it was the "prod-
uct I needed at the time" and thirty-five percent said a "special offer or discount." Id.
15. The Federal Trade Commission has specifically focused on the high percentage of
false claims in spam, Federal Trade Commission, False Claims in Spam <http://
www.ftc.gov/reports/spam/030429spamreport.pdf> (Apr. 30, 2003). These concerns are ef-
fectively subsumed under the category of irrelevant and unhelpful e-mails. Other harms
created by false claims are covered under other existing laws like false advertising.
20031
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ing and dictionary attacks. 16
Even though spammers can profitably send very-low relevance e-
mails to lots of recipients, not all spam is bad. Inevitably, some recipi-
ents will find a particular spain e-mail helpful and relevant. More specif-
ically, recipients' perceptions about each spam's relevance usually sort
into a bell curve: some will find the e-mail completely irrelevant, some
will find the e-mail very relevant, and others will find the e-mail some-
what relevant.1 7
Some empirical data supports this analysis. Several recent surveys
show that seven to eight percent of those surveyed have purchased a
product or service in response to spami8 and approximately thirty per-
cent of those surveyed have responded to spam to get more information
about the advertised product or service. 19 While not high percentages,
the statistics seemingly contradict spam's abysmal reputation. For re-
cipients who responded to spam (plus those who were educated but did
not respond), the spam was relevant. For those who purchased in re-
sponse to a particular spain, that e-mail helped the consumer find a de-
sired product or service at an acceptable price.
We should not trivialize these consequences. Spam plays an impor-
tant role in the marketplace of ideas, perhaps filling gaps left by other
media, and can contribute to efficiently functioning economic markets.
In some cases, spam creates transaction opportunities that otherwise
would not occur due to prohibitive search costs or lack of consumer
awareness about products available to solve their needs.
Of course, these conclusions do not change the fact that most spam is
unwanted by most recipients. However, it is unclear why individuals
seem less tolerant of irrelevant spam than irrelevant ads in other media.
Consumers routinely tolerate irrelevant ads in other media with less an-
noyance than they feel towards spam.
Let us consider ad relevancy in a few media, starting with bill-
boards. Billboard ads target viewers only by geography (if that), so they
16. See Jack Hitt, Confessions ofa Spam King, N.Y. Times Mag., (Sept. 28, 2003) at 48
(describing different methods of acquiring e-mail addresses cheaply); see generally Ian Ay-
res & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy: A Solution for the Blight of Telemarketing (and
Spam and Junk Mail), 20 Yale J. on Reg. 77 (2003) (discussing the analogous phenomenon
in the telemarketing context).
17. Recipient assessments of relevancy also vary based on when the e-mail is received.
An e-mail to Jane offering a cheap price on the digital camera may be very relevant prior to
her purchase and irrelevant afterwards.
18. See The Pew Report, supra n. 10, at ii-iii (seven percent); Mailshell Survey, supra n.
7 (eight percent); Thomas Leavitt, posting to Politech <http://www.politechbot.comp-
04710.html> (May 2, 2003) (citing a survey on npdor.com that seven percent "sometimes"
buy from spain, plus another twenty-three percent "very rarely" buy).
19. See The Pew Report, supra n. 10, at ii-iii (thirty-three percent); Mailshell Survey,
supra n. 7 (twenty-eight percent).
[Vol. XXII
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are fairly low-relevancy advertising tools, meaning that most billboard
ads will be irrelevant to most viewers.
The broadcast and newspaper media use differentiated content to
segment consumers. 20 Thus, a TV show will appeal to a certain demo-
graphic, and newspapers divide their content into topical sections (e.g.
sports, business, metro) that are read by only some readers. This seg-
mentation means that ads can be targeted to consumers attracted by the
surrounding content. Nevertheless, even the most targeted content will
appeal to multiple demographics, so the associated ads will be less rele-
vant to non-majority audience segments.
In these other media like billboards, broadcasting and newspapers,
consumers do not vociferously demand regulation to minimize the irrele-
vancy of ads delivered through them. Why do consumers feel differently
about spam?
2. Sorting Spam Wastes Time
Perhaps recipients penalize spam because it takes time to sort irrel-
evant spam from wanted e-mails. Sorting also creates the risk of Type I
and Type II errors (i.e., legitimate e-mail gets tossed or blocked as spam,
and objectionable spam gets through the sorting).2 1
But once again, spam is not different from other media. Every me-
dium that contains ads requires consumers to sort ads from content and
wanted ads from unwanted ads. For example, sorting postal mail re-
quires the recipient to evaluate the envelope's exterior and, in some
cases, open and review the contents. Broadcast ads are even more diffi-
cult to sort, because ads are interspersed with content and the viewer
cannot reorder or skip the ads.
So while spam does require sorting time, recipients can manually
sort e-mail relatively efficiently by reviewing subject lines, 22 and many
20. Not all ads are delivered on a segmented basis. For example, infomercials are
often broadcast at a time when other programming would fail to generate a sufficient audi-
ence, so frequently infomercials make no effort to segment the audience.
21. See CAN-SPAM Act, supra n. 1, at § 2(a)(4) (legislative finding of Congress).
22. The Pew Report, supra n. 10, at 11 ("[allmost 90% of users say they identify spam
by looking at the subject line and/or the sender"). CAN-SPAM provides further legal pro-
tection against misleading subject lines. CAN-SPAM Act, supra n. 1, at § 5(a)(2). Seven-
teen states also had laws regulating misleading subject lines. See Arizona [Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 44-1372.01(A)(2) (2003)], Illinois [815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 511/10(a) (2003)], Indiana [Ind.
Code § 24-5-22-7(3) (2003)], Kansas [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-6,107(c)(1)(B) (2002)], Maryland
[Md. Com. Law § 14-3002(b)(2)(iii) (2002)], Minnesota [Minn. Stat. § 325F.694(2)(2)
(2002)], Missouri [Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.1144(1) (2003)], Nevada [Nev. Rev. Stat.
205.492(1)(a) (2003)], North Dakota [N.D. Cent. Code § 51-27-02(1)(b) (2003), Oklahoma
[Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 776.6(A)(2) (2003)], Oregon [Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.607(3)(1)(b) (2003)],
Pennsylvania [Pa. Cons. Stat. tit. 73 § 2250.3(a)(3) (West 2002)], South Dakota [S.D. Codi-
fied Laws § 37-24-37(2) (Michie 2002)], Texas [Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 46.002(2)
2003]
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recipients develop good skills doing SO. 2 3 Spam can also be automatically
blocked without any manual sorting using e-mail filters. As a result, the
amount of time "wasted" on the e-mail sorting process may very well be
less than the time wasted in other media.
All media containing ads demand sorting time and create some risk
of erroneous sorting, and no regulatory scheme-other than banning a
medium altogether-can eliminate that. Instead, time lost to sorting is
unavoidable in a media-based society, and spam is just one of many man-
ifestations of that phenomenon.2 4 Thus, the explanation for recipients'
antipathy towards spam must lie elsewhere.
3. Spam Causes Recipients to Lose Control of Their In-Boxes
Evidence suggests that many recipients are bothered by their inabil-
ity to stop spam2 5 and feel that spam is a loss of privacy. This suggests
that recipient frustration with spam may be the result of a feeling that
recipients have lost control over their in-boxes.
However, once again this problem arises with other media. Recipi-
ents cannot stop spam except by eliminating their e-mail account alto-
gether, but consumers of other media are similarly powerless to change
what ads are delivered in that medium except by discontinuing use of
that medium. For example, a newspaper or magazine reader cannot con-
trol what ads are published; the reader's only choices are to ignore un-
wanted ads or stop reading the publication altogether. This argument
holds true for broadcast media, billboards, and junk mail as well.
Perhaps e-mail can be distinguished from other media because it de-
livers more important personal content to recipients than other media.
Recipients seem to develop a special and personal relationship with their
in-box, and this explanation might offer an insight about why
telemarketing is so reviled.2 6 But this explanation is not totally satisfac-
(Vernon 2003)], Washington [Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.020(1)(b) (1999)], West Virginia
[W. Va. Code Ann. § 46A-6G-2(2) (Michie 1999)], Wyoming [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-
402(a)(ii) (Michie 2003)]. Presumably these state laws are not preempted by CAN-SPAM.
See CAN-SPAM Act, supra n. 1, at § 8(b).
23. The Pew Report, supra n. 10, at 11 ("nearly two-thirds (63%) of all e-mailers say
about spam that they 'know it right away when they see it'"); see George Johnson, Sp@m
ShEn@nig@nS!!; That Gibberish in Your In-Box May Be Good News, N.Y. Times (New
York, NY) (Jan. 25, 2004), at § 4, p. 16 (discussing how spam filters cause spam to "degen-
erate[e] into nonsense" and become "word salad").
24. See Eric Goldman, S.J. Mercury News, Spam is Just a Byproduct of Our Media-
Saturated World 6B <http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/opinion/6209142.
htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp> (July 1, 2003).
25. The Pew Report, supra n. 10, at 27 (seventy-five percent of users are bothered by
this).
26. See Ayres & Funk, supra n. 16 (discussing a heightened sense of privacy at home).
[Vol. XXII
HeinOnline  -- 22 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 18 2003-2004
WHERE'S THE BEEF?
tory because it does not explain the seeming dichotomy between the out-
rage over spam and comparative tolerance of junk mail.
A more satisfying explanation can be found by considering the rela-
tive adoption curves of spam and other media. We have had many years
to develop ways to cope with ads in other media, but we are still develop-
ing ways to cope with e-mail ads. It seems likely that users will improve
their ability to manage e-mail with more experience, at which point user
frustration should decrease. 2 7 Meanwhile, new generations who grow up
using e-mail should be more tolerant of spam28 because they will develop
coping strategies for spam (and media inputs generally) from an early
age.
Thus, current annoyance with spam could merely reflect that user
experience with e-mail is evolving. Robust e-mail management tools also
should reduce annoyance, and the current annoyance may also reflect
that those tools are not yet adequately deployed.
29
4. Conclusion on Annoyance
Unwanted e-mails are annoying, but minor annoyances are a fact of
life, and no law can eliminate them-from e-mail or otherwise. E-mail
recipients' annoyance at spam appears to be an overreaction when com-
pared to their reactions to other forms of annoying ads. Meanwhile, reg-
ulation of spam creates significant risk that some relevant e-mails will
be blocked from recipients who want them. It is troubling to regulate
content to protect the majority from minor annoyances if the conse-
27. Taylor, supra n. 6 (noting that the percentage of people very annoyed with spam
dropped from eighty percent in 2002 to sixty-four percent in May 2003, suggesting that
recipients are developing more efficient coping mechanisms); DoubleClick 2003 Consumer
E-mail Study 7 <http://www.doubleclick.comus/knowledgecentral/documents/research/
dcconsumere-mailstudy_0310.pdf> (Oct. 2003) (describing increased user sophistication in
deleting suspected spam without reading it); but see The Pew Report, supra n. 10, at 36
(indicating that veteran Internet users are more sophisticated at managing spam but are
also more bothered than average by it).
28. The Pew Report, supra n. 10, at 33.
29. See generally Stefanie Olsen, CNET News.com, Yahoo, Sendmail to Test Antispam
System <http://news.com.com/2102-1032_3-5164279.html?tag=st.util.print> (Feb. 24, 2004)
(discussing new e-mail sender authentication efforts such as DomainKeys, Sender Permit-
ted From, and caller ID for e-mail); Evan I. Schwartz, Spam Wars, Tech. Rev., at 32, 34-35
(July/Aug. 2003) (discussing technological solutions such as signature-based filtering, col-
laborative filtering, gateway intercepts, heuristic filtering, Bayesian filtering, circles of
trust and vaccinations); Hanah Metchis & Solveig Singleton, Spam, That Ill O' the ISP: A
Reality Check for Legislators, Competitive Enterprise Institute 9-12 <http://www.cei.org/pdf/
3482.pdf> (May 21, 2003) (discussing technological solutions such as content filters, white-
lists, challenge-response systems, collaborative filtering, blacklists (also called "block
lists"), bonded sender programs and protocol redesigns); Ferris Research, Spam Control:
Problems and Opportunities 29-34, 39-42 <http://www.ferris.com/rep/200301report.pdf>
(Jan. 2003) (surveying the various anti-spam technology providers).
2003]
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quence is preventing minority interests from exchanging relevant
content.
C. SPAMMERS IMPOSE COSTS ON THIRD PARTIES
As it moves from sender to recipient, spam generates bandwidth and
server processing costs for the spammer's LAP, the recipient and the re-
cipient's IAP. Depending on a spammer's practices, they can also impose
some costs on unsuspecting third parties, such as server operators with
open mail relays and or whose domains are forged. We consider each
cost in turn.
1. The Spammer's IAP
The spammer and its IAP have contractual privity, and the IAP can
technologically constrain the spammer's activities (i.e. capping the quan-
tity of e-mails sent). As a result, a spammer's IAP has the capacity to
charge spammers for any spain-related costs, 3 0 and there are no obvious
market failures that require regulatory protection for the spammer's
lAP.
2. Recipients and Their IAPs
It is frequently claimed that recipients pay to receive spam,3 1 and
sometimes spam is likened to junk mail sent with postage due.3 2 With
respect to individuals with a consumer IAP account, this claim is no
longer accurate. It was true prior to the mid-1990s, when many IAPs
charged customers a time-based fee for Internet connectivity. Because
each e-mail took some time to download, recipients paid a small fee for
each e-mail they received. Today, consumer LAPs almost universally
charge flat-rate pricing for unlimited usage, 33 so consumer recipients do
not pay for each e-mail received.
30. Privity and technological control also apply to IAPs or e-mail service providers who
provide spammer "dropboxes," where the spammer directs replies to a validly-established
e-mail account that the spammer knows will be overrun and shut down.
31. See e.g. CAN-SPAM Act, supra n. 1, at §2(a)(3) (legislative finding of Congress);
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(e) (2003) (legislative finding of California); State v. Heckel,
24 P.3d 404, 410 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 2001); Proceedings, Federal Trade Commission Spam
Forum (Day One) 6 <http:/www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spantranscript-dayl.pdf> (Apr.
30, 2003) (statement of Chairman Muris).
32. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529(h) (2003) (legislative finding of California).
33. See John Borland, CNET News.com, Putting a Lid on Broadband Use <http:/l
news.com.com/2102-1034_3-5079624.html?tag=st-util-print> (Sept. 22, 2003) (but noting
that some cable broadband providers are trying to impose some high-end usage limits to
avoid line congestion). In contrast, many non-US telephone callers pay per-minute connect
charges to make local calls, in which case callers accessing the Internet via dial-up connec-
tions pay time-based connection fees for reading or downloading their e-mail. Many service
providers do limit the size of a customer's e-mail account, so in theory a user might procure
[Vol. XXII
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However, recipient IAPs bear some bandwidth and server processing
costs for each e-mail they process, plus preventative costs (like filtering)
and remediation costs (like blocking or database repair) associated with
pernicious e-mail. Unlike the spammer's IAP, the recipient's IAP has no
contractual privity or technological relationship with the spammer. And
where corporations provide Internet connectivity to their employees,
they incur these costs as a recipient directly. As a result, recipient IAPs
and corporations may benefit from legal systems that allow them to pass
those costs back to spammers or avoid the costs altogether.
Until recently, common law trespass to chattels was an important
legal mechanism to accomplish that objective.3 4 However, in Intel Corp.
v. Hamidi,35 the California Supreme Court recently scaled the doctrine
back, rejecting trespass to chattels when a low-volume spammer's e-
mails did not threaten to impair (or actually impair) the functioning of
Intel's systems. 3 6 It remains unclear how subsequent courts will inter-
pret Intel, but in all likelihood some future spammers will avoid liability
for trespass to chattels.
Irrespective of trespass to chattels, corporations and recipient lAPs
can use, and have successfully used, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
("CFAA") to combat spam.3 7 CAN-SPAM supplements the CFAA (and
whatever is left of common law trespass to chattels) by providing recipi-
ent IAPs a direct cause of action when the IAP is "adversely affected" by
a spammer who fails to comply with selected other provisions of CAN-
SPAM.3 8 Depending on how broadly courts interpret the words "ad-
versely affected," this provision may moot Hamidi's common law analy-
sis by providing a statutory cause of action. At minimum, CAN-SPAM
expedites recipient IAP causes of action by providing statutory damages
and attorneys' fees 3 9 and by providing another basis (in addition to the
CFAA) for federal court jurisdiction. As a result, CAN-SPAM should
a larger e-mail account to ensure enough capacity for both wanted e-mails and spam. How-
ever, users who regularly purge their e-mails should rarely encounter a problem.
34. See e.g. Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online,
Inc. v. Natl. Health Care Discount, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Iowa 2001); Am. Online,
Inc. v. Over the Air Equip., Inc., Civil Action 97-1547-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 19, 1997); Am. On-
line, Inc. v. Prime Data Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 34016692 (E.D. Va. 1998); CompuServe Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money
Pie Inc., 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
35. 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2003).
36. Id. at 43.
37. See e.g. Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online,
Inc. v. Natl. Health Care Discount, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Iowa 2001); Hotmail
Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
38. CAN-SPAM Act, supra n. 1, at § 7(g).
39. Id. § 7(g)(3)-(4).
2003]
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help recipient lAPs control some of the e-mail processing costs that are
externalized to them.
In addition to bandwidth, server, preventative and maintenance
costs, some companies have sought legal recognition for the time employ-
ees waste on spam.40 Indeed, analysts claim that this lost time creates
enormous costs. 41 However, as discussed in Section II supra, time spent
sorting or reading spam is not necessarily wasted, nor is it unique com-
pared to the many other ways that employees waste time (e.g. personal
e-mail, junk mail and personal telephone calls). Therefore, lost produc-
tivity due to spam is a poor policy basis for regulating spam.
3. Open Mail Relays
Spammers can offload costs to third party computers who have open
mail relays, which can cause those server operators to incur some costs
like any other recipient IAP. Of course, operators wishing to avoid those
costs can simply close their mail relays, and interestingly these opera-
tors are often considered part of the problem, not victims. 42 Thus, forc-
ing them to internalize the spam-created costs (rather than pushing
those costs to a spammer) may motivate them to close the relays.4 3
40. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32.
41. See Nucleus Research, Spain: The Silent ROI Killer, Research Note D59 <http:l!
www.nucleusresearch.com/research/d59.pdf> (accessed July 1, 2003) (claiming that em-
ployees have an average lost productivity of 1.4 percent per year, meaning that spam costs
$874 per employee per year); Ferris Research, Spam Control: Problems and Opportunities
7, 16-17 <http://www.ferris.com/rep/200301/report.pdf> (accessed Jan. 2003) ("[iun 2002,
the total cost of spam to corporate organizations in the United States was $8.9 billion," of
which forty-four percent was attributable to lost productivity); Basex, Spam E-mail and Its
Impact on IT Spending and Productivity 5 <http://www.basex.com/poty2003.nsf/e67dc
Of5617d6e9c85256a99005eaOe7/f8761f74ba37069385256eO40019f314/$FILE/BasexReport.
Spam.pdf> (Dec. 2003) ("tlhe cost of spain to companies worldwide is ca. $20 billion and
growing at almost 100% per year"). See generally Saul Hansell, Diverging Estimates of the
Cost of Spam, N.Y. Times, at C1 (July 28, 2003) (discussing and critiquing these studies).
42. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-402(b)(iii) (2003) (treating operators of open mail re-
lays as responsible for participating in the dissemination of spam); Declan McCullagh,
CNETNews.com, FTC Eyes Network Operators in Spam Battle <http://news.com.com/2102-
7355_35150455.html?tag=stutil-print> (Jan. 29, 2004) (the FTC e-mailed thousands of
network operators with open mail relays asking them to stop); Chip Rosenthal, MAPS TSI:
Anti-Relay: What is Third-Party Mail Relay? <http://mail-abuse.org/tsi/ar-what.html>
(Apr. 23, 2001) (indicating that networked computers that permit open mail relays may be
"blacklisted" by anti-spam vigilante groups).
43. Although CAN-SPAM did not expressly set up a cost-shifting mechanism for opera-
tors of open mail relays, it did criminalize their use by spammers. See CAN-SPAM Act,
supra n. 1, at §§ 4(a)(1), 5(b)(3).
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4. Targets of Forged Headers
Spammers also can offload costs to third parties using forged head-
ers. A forged header occurs when a spammer manipulates an e-mail to
make it look like the spam originated from X.com when it is really being
sent from Y.com. 4 4 The X.com domain name operator (or its IAP) incurs
costs when undeliverable messages and recipient complaints are directed
to the operator.
The operator of a forged domain name lacks any contractual or tech-
nological way to prevent this activity,4 5 so regulatory protection is appro-
priate. Indeed, thirty states prohibited forged headers, 4 6 and these state
44. See id. at § 3(8) (defining "header information").
45. Forged headers can be prevented only if e-mail senders are better authenticated.
Project Lumos is being developed to tackle that problem. See Hans Peter Brondmo et al.,
E-mail Service Provider Coalition, Project Lumos: A Solutions Blueprint for Solving the
Spam Problem by Establishing Volume E-mail Sender Accountability <http://www.network
advertising.org/espc/ProjectLumosWhite-Paper.pdf> (Sept. 24, 2003); see also Olsen,
supra n. 25.
46. See Arizona [Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1372.01(A)(1) (2003)], Arkansas [Ark. Code Ann.
§ 4-88-603(c)(2) (Michie 2003)], Colorado [Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-2.5-103(2) (2000)], Connecti-
cut [Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 53-451(b)(7) (1999)], Delaware [Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 937(b)
(1999)], Idaho [Idaho Code § 48-603E(3)(b) (Michie 2000)], Illinois [815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 511/
10(a) (2003)], Indiana [Ind. Code § 24-5-22-7(2) (2003)], Iowa [Iowa Code § 714E.1(2)(b)
(1999)], Kansas [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-6,107(c)(1)(A) (2002)], Louisiana [La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 73.6(B) (1999)], Maine [Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1497(5)(B) (2003)], Maryland [Md.
Com. Law § 14-3002(b)(2)(ii) (2002)], Michigan [Mich. Stat. Ann. § 445.2501(4)(b) (2003)],
Minnesota [Minn. Stat. § 325F.694(2)(1) (2002)], Nevada [Nev. Rev. Stat. 205.492(1)(a)
(2003)], North Carolina [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-458(6) (1999)], North Dakota [N.D. Cent.
Code § 51-27-02(1)(a) (2003)], Ohio [Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.64(H) (West 2002)],
Oklahoma [Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 776.6(A)(1) (2003)], Oregon [Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 646.607(3)(1)(c) (2003)], Pennsylvania [18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7661(a)(1) (2002) and Pa.
Cons. Stat. tit. 73 § 2250.4(2) (West 2002) ], Rhode Island [R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4(7)
(1999)], South Dakota [S.D. Codified Laws § 37-24-37(1) (Michie 2002)], Texas [Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code Ann. § 46.002(1) (Vernon 2003)], Utah [Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-36-103(2) (2002)],
Virginia [Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-152.3:1(A)(1) (Michie 2003)], Washington [Wash. Rev. Code
§ 19.190.020(1)(a) (1999)], West Virginia [W. Va. Code Ann. § 46A-6G-2(1) (Michie 1999)],
Wyoming [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-402(a)(i) (Michie 2003)].
In addition, fourteen states prohibited the dissemination of software used to forge
header information. See Arkansas [Ark. Code Ann. § 5-41-205(a)(3) (Michie 2003)], Con-
necticut [Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 53-451(c) (1999)], Delaware [Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 937(c)
(1999)], Illinois [720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/16D-3(a-15) (2000)], Kansas [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-
6,107(c)(5) (2002)], Louisiana [La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73.6(B) (1999)], Michigan [Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 445.2501(5) (2003)], Nevada [Nev. Rev. Stat. 205.492(3) (2003)], Oklahoma [Okla.
Stat. tit. 15, § 776.1(E) (2003)], Pennsylvania [18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7661(a)(2) (2002) and
Pa. Cons. Stat. tit. 73 § 2250.4(5) (West 2002)], Rhode Island [R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4(8)
(1999)], Tennessee [Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-2501(g) (2003)], Virginia [Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.2-152.3:1(A)(2) (Michie 2003)], West Virginia [W. Va. Code Ann. § 46A-6G-4 (Michie
1999)].
2003]
HeinOnline  -- 22 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 23 2003-2004
24 JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW
laws may not be preempted by CAN-SPAM.4 7 Meanwhile, CAN-SPAM
criminalizes forged headers 48 and potentially sets up a private cause of
action for some victims ("providers of Internet access services" who are
"adversely affected"). 49 The robustness of this private cause of action re-
mains to be seen, but this CAN-SPAM provision, plus any coverage
under non-preempted state laws and other existing doctrines like trade-
mark law and the CFAA,50 should provide substantial protection to the
victims of forged headers.
5. Conclusion on Costs
Far too much rhetoric is directed to the costs borne by individual
spam recipients. These individuals no longer bear a financial cost to re-
ceive spam, and any "costs" associated with the consumption of their at-
tention makes unsupportable assumptions about the e-mail's relevancy
to the recipient. Similarly, although sending IAPs may find it desirable
to obtain regulatory protection against spam, they can control their fi-
nancial exposure to spammers' behavior through pricing and technology.
Focusing on the costs borne by individual recipients and sending
IAPs detracts from the parties who incur uncontrollable costs from spam,
such as recipient IAPs, operators of open mail relays and victims of
forged headers. CAN-SPAM provides some useful legal tools to protect
these parties, although those tools may be incomplete. A crisper under-
standing of the real costs borne by these parties would have likely pro-
duced a more thoughtful legal solution.
D. SPAM CONTAINS OR PROMOTES OBJECTIONABLE CONTENT
Many spam recipients complain about objectionable content of spam,
especially pornographic spam. 51 Due to deep feelings towards porno-
graphic spam, Congress specifically targeted it in CAN-SPAM by requir-
47. See CAN-SPAM Act, supra n. 1, at § 8(b)(1) (state laws that "prohibit falsity or
deception in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or information attached
thereto" are not preempted).
48. See id. §§ 4(a)(1), 5(a)(1).
49. See id. § 7(g)(1).
50. See Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998); Parker v.
C.N. Enters., No. 97-06273 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Sept. 17, 1997).
51. See The Pew Report, supra n. 10, at 44 ("[in nearly every measure we tested, por-
nography soared to the top as the most offensive, objectionable, destructive type of spam");
Taylor, supra n. 6 (eighty-six percent of those surveyed said pornographic spam annoyed
them a lot); unspam, Comprehensive Sparn Survey (Oct. 2003) <http://www.unspam.com
fight-spam/information/surveyoct2003.html> (Oct. 15, 2003) (ninety-six percent of par-
ents are looking to block pornographic spam from reaching their children); see also CAN-
SPAM Act, supra n. 1, at § 2(a)(5) (legislative findings of Congress).
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ing warning labels. 5 2 But to understand the harms pornographic spam
causes, it is useful to consider adults and minors separately.
For adults, pornographic spam is no different from any other form of
unwanted content discussed in Section II(B) supra.53 Nevertheless, Con-
gress has tried to help adults avoid unwanted pornographic spam by re-
quiring special labeling of pornographic spam in the subject line. 54
When implemented, this requirement can help recipients who automati-
cally filter e-mail using the appropriate words because the spam will au-
tomatically be routed outside the recipient's ordinary view. Until
spammers regularly comply with this law, however, filtering will not be
helpful.
The mandatory labeling law may be even less helpful to recipients
who manually sort e-mail. These recipients may still see objectionable
content if the subject line contains objectionable terms or the recipient's
e-mail software "previews" a message and the previewed content is
objectionable.
So how can regulatory intervention help recipients avoid objectiona-
ble e-mails? With widely varying perceptions of what constitutes objec-
tionable content, regulating objectionable ads is no more feasible than
regulating irrelevant ads. Thus, the only "solution" may be for recipients
to manage their exposures themselves, either through technological
measures or by looking elsewhere when something offends. 5 5
Putting the burden on recipients to avoid pornographic spam is less
satisfactory when recipients are minors. In that case, society may be
harmed when minors view this inappropriate material.5 6
However, minors' exposure to pornographic spam is a microcosm of a
much greater problem: minors with e-mail accounts. 57 This is a major
52. See CAN-SPAM Act, supra n. 1, at § 5(b). Several states had also targeted porno-
graphic spam, including Alaska, Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Utah, West
Virginia and Wisconsin. See David E. Sorkin, Spamlaws.com, Spam Laws: United States:
State Laws: Summary <http://www.spamlaws.com/state/summary.html> (accessed Oct. 30,
2003).
53. However, some adults find viewing pornographic span qualitatively more objec-
tionable than other spam.
54. See CAN-SPAM Act, supra n. 1, at § 5(b).
55. Cf Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (putting the burden on citizens to redirect
their attention if they objected to a profanity-emblazoned jacket).
56. It is well-accepted that states have a compelling state interest in protecting minors
from being exposed to materials that are indecent or harmful to them. Reno v. Am. Civ.
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) ("[wle agreed that 'there is a compelling interest in
protecting the physical and psychological well being of minors' which extended to shielding
them from indecent messages that are not obscene by adult standards") (quoting Sable
Commun. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)).
57. This is a rapidly growing phenomenon. See Symantec Corporation, Symantec Sur-
vey Reveals More than 80 Percent of Children Using E-mail Receive Inappropriate Spam
Daily <http://www.symantec.com/press/cgi/printfriendlypress.cgi?release=2003/nO36O9a.
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social development because historically minors had few communication
media that readily bypassed parental oversight. Today, minors can use
e-mail, instant messenger, and cell phones to communicate with third
parties without any parental oversight and knowledge. With this addi-
tional autonomy, minors can get into inappropriate and potentially very
dangerous situations, such as interactions with sexual predators. 58
Because of these risks, some parents restrict minors' access to the
Internet altogether, and other parents permit only supervised Internet
use. The former prevents any risk of exposure to pornographic spam,
and the latter approach gives parents the ability to pre-screen porno-
graphic spam or counsel the minor when seeing such spam.
Otherwise, parents who let minors have unsupervised e-mail use
make a huge decision, and it is not made lightly. Because these parents
accept the risk that their children will engage in dangerous online be-
havior, the problem of pornographic spam seems almost trivial by com-
parison. If the parents trust their children enough to give them that
autonomy, perhaps we should infer that the parents deem their children
responsible enough to cope with pornographic spam.
Regulation cannot easily solve these problems. Efforts to specifically
ban pornographic spam are likely unconstitutional 59 and do not affect e-
mails from foreign jurisdictions. Lesser efforts, like mandatory labeling,
have low efficacy. Ultimately, there can be no substitute for parental
involvement in their children's use of e-mail.
html> (June 9, 2003) (news release of the Symantec Corporation) (seventy-six percent of
minors between ages seven and eighteen have at least one e-mail account).
58. See Abigail Van Buren, Internet Predators Pose a Challenge to All Parents, Milwau-
kee J. Sentinel <http://www.jsonline.com/lifestyle/advice/oct03/180747.asp?format=print>
(Oct. 29, 2003). Inevitably, children will also get inappropriate e-mail. Symantec Corpora-
tion, Symantec Survey Reveals More than 80 Percent of Children Using E-mail Receive In-
appropriate Spam Daily <http://www.symantec.com/press/cgi/printfriendlypress.cgi?
release=2003/n030609a.html> (June 9, 2003) (news release of the Symantec Corporation)
(eighty percent of surveyed minors received inappropriate spam on a daily basis).
59. See Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (declaring the Communi-
cations Decency Act unconstitutional); Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Napolitano, No. CV-00-
0505-TUC-AM (D. Ariz. 2002) (striking down Arizona's statute); Am. Booksellers Found. v.
Dean, 342 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (striking down Vermont's statute); Am. Library Assn. v.
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (striking down New York's statute); Cyberspace
Commun., Inc. v. Engler, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000) (striking down Michigan's statute);
Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (striking down New
Mexico's statute); PSINet v. Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878 (W.D. Va. 2001) (striking down
Virginia's statute); Bookfriends, Inc. v. Taft, 233 F. Supp. 2d 932 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (striking
down Ohio's statute).
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III. CONCLUSION
Society is still evolving ways to cope with media saturation. Spa m
contributes to this problem, but so do other media. Yet, many recipients
hate spam more than other ads. As explored by this Essay, this dichoto-
mous attitude is hard to explain. Nevertheless, the anger has caused
anti-spam rhetoric to reach hyperbolic levels. But, while many spam op-
ponents decry spam as a system breakdown, the breakdown has been
more political than technological. Most state-based attempts to regulate
spam, a product of political grandstanding or legislator rage instead of
rational policy-making, were ineffectual, 60 reflecting their weak policy
underpinnings. Early feedback on CAN-SPAM suggests the federal law
will not be any more effective. 6 1
Even if CAN-SPAM beneficially affects the flow of unwanted e-
mails, any legislative solution seems inherently empty. Without legisla-
tive intervention, society will find ways to cope with spam, just as we
have with other media. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs will continue to de-
velop better tools to sort wanted and unwanted communications. Thus,
more patience with the spam "problem" might have facilitated the devel-
opment of superior results organically.
60. See e.g. E-mail in December Dominated by Spain, L.A. Times (Jan. 3, 2004) (availa-
ble in LEXIS, News & Business >News> By Individual Publication >L> Los Angeles Times)
(citing a study by MessageLabs showing that spam had increased from thirty-four percent
of all e-mail in December 2002 to fifty-six percent of all e-mail in December 2003);
Brightmail Inc., 50% of Internet E-Mail is Now Spam According to Anti-Span Leader
Brightmail® <http://www.brightmail.com/pressreleases/082003-50-percent-spam.html>
(Aug. 20, 2003) (press release of Brightmail Inc.) (quoting Enrique Salem, Brightmail Pres-
ident and CEO, as saying that "In less than 2 years, spam messages have increased from
8% of all e-mail traffic to more than half").
61. See Stefanie Olsen, CNET News.com, Study: Spammers Turning Blind Eye to the
Law <http://news.com.com/2102-1032-3-5156629.html?tag=st.util.print> (Feb. 10, 2004)
(citing studies showing that only three percent of bulk commercial e-mail complied with the
law, that spam had increased as a percentage of all e-mail following the law's passage, and
that more spam was originating overseas since the law passed).
Then again, many experts never expected the law to be effective, which perhaps rein-
forces that the predominant problem with spain is political. See Declan McCullagh, CNET
News.com, Spam Keeps Cookin'-Despite New Laws <http://news.com.com/2102-1024_3516
0503.html?tag=st.util.print> (Feb. 17, 2004) ("[a] U.S. Justice Department prosecutor
warned Tuesday that a new spam law's criminal sanctions likely will not stem the flow of
bulk solicitations that are flooding into e-mail in-boxes").
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